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Best of Intentions?: Rinderpest, Containment Practices, and Rebellion in
Rhodesia in 1896
Abstract

Rinderpest was a deadly bovine virus that plagued cattle herds accross Europe and Asia for centuries. In the
late 1880s to early 1890s, the virus found its way to Africa, where it wiped out thousands of non-immune
cattle herds belonging to African pastoralists and agriculturalists. By February 1896, the virus had crossed the
Rhodesian border along the Zambezi River and began killing off cattle owned by ethnic groups that included
the Matabele and the Shona, as well as cattle owned by white settlers. In an effort to contain the virus, the
British South African Company consulted with colonial officials in the Cape Colony, who in turn advised the
local police in Rhodesia to practice quarantines of cattle herds and authorized the shooting of sick and healthy
cattle in order to create a buffer zone against the virus. The harsh practices of the legalized killing of cattle,
coupled with a pre-existing tense political situation, convinced the Matabele people to take an armed stand
against the colonial state.
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Best of Intentions?: Rinderpest, Containment
Practices, and Rebellion in Rhodesia in 1896
By Brandon Katzung Hokanson

Even the most miniscule of organisms on earth are
incredibly capable of historical agency. Viruses—invisible to
human eyes without the aid of an electron microscope—have
proven to be profound agents in human history.1 It was because of
a virus that the African continent, in the final decade of the
nineteenth century, witnessed one of the worst agricultural
disasters of recent human history. Rinderpest, an extremely fatal
bovine virus, left a trail of dead cattle and devastated African
pastoralists and farmers in its wake. By the spring of 1896, the
virus had reached the northern banks of the Zambezi River, and
when word emerged that it had crossed the natural barrier in
February, it did not take long for the rumors to prove true: cattle
began dying in southern Africa in droves, and the British colonial
state struggled to cope with an entity that failed to respect
borderlines on a map. The British responded to the rinderpest
outbreak by practicing quarantines and mass killings of sick and
healthy cattle, which proved to be a gross cultural
misunderstanding on the part of the colonial state. I argue that
these earliest veterinary practices forced upon locals in southern
Africa by the British colonial state to contain rinderpest were a
major contributing factor for the Matabele Rebellion of 1896-7.

1

To better understand just how impactful the historical relationship diseases
share with humans, see William McNeil, Plagues and People (Garden City, NY:
Anchor Press, 1977).
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Cattle were far more than just a food source to the Matabele, as the
British would quickly find out.
Narratives written by Africanist scholars dedicated
exclusively to the rinderpest outbreak exist in a substantial number.
However, the majority of existing narratives have focused on
British-administered southern Africa.2 Since the 1890’s rinderpest
outbreak was continent-wide, particularly proving devastating in
the northern and eastern regions, the contemporary historiography
is unrepresentative of the true magnitude of the disease’s outbreak.
A handful of authors like Helge Kjekshus do make an effort to
shed some light on the devastating impact the virus had on East
Africa, however the gap in knowledge about the rinderpest
outbreak in southern African versus its outbreak in eastern and
northern Africa, and even German South West Africa, is still
significant.3 Reason for such a discrepancy is perhaps due to the
large quantities of southern Africa-based and Anglophone sources
related to the late nineteenth century outbreak that are available in
the historical record. Although this paper ultimately contributes to
the Anglo-centric historiography focused on British southern
Africa—partially due to the larger availability of sources dealing
with that region—it does bring forth an important and undercovered aspect of the outbreak by highlighting the role that the
2

A thorough survey of rinderpest works focused on southern Africa include the
following: Charles Ballard, “The Repercussions of Rinderpest: Cattle Plague
and Peasant Decline in Colonial Natal,” The International Journal of African
Historical Studies 19. no. 3 (1986); Daniel Gilfoyle, “Veterinary Research and
the African Rinderpest Epizootic: The Cape Colony, 18896-1898,” Journal of
Southern African Studies 29. no. 1 (March, 2003); C. van Onselen, “Reactions to
Rinderpest in Southern Africa 1896-1897,” The Journal of African History 13,
no. 3 (1972); and Pule Phoofolo, “Face to Face with Famine: The BaSotho and
the Rinderpest, 1897-1899,” Journal of Southern African Studies 29, no. 2 (June
2003).
3
Helge Kjeksjus, Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African
History (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1996), 126-132.
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early veterinary practices played in contributing to the Matabele
Rebellion. In order to do so, a brief and general history of the
outbreak in northern and eastern Africa will be presented, followed
by details of how the British colonial state reacted when it first
appeared in Rhodesia, which, coupled with a description of the
importance of cattle to the Matabele people, will demonstrate how
these early practices to stop the spread of the virus in the end
contributed to an all-out war.
Rinderpest, also known as “cattle plague,” has devasted
cattle herds and the psyches of cattle farmers and pastoralists
throughout its history.4 Death by rinderpest for cattle was a brutal
experience and at the very least an unsightly one for cattle owners
because the rinderpest virus, Morbillivirus, caused a number of
painful and visually disturbing symptoms like profuse nasal and
eye discharge, bloody fecal discharge, and labored breathing. Upon
infection, most cattle would die of the disease in a period of six to
twelve days. Most importantly, virgin soil-epidemics of the virus—
land with no prior experience with rinderpest—were especially
devastating because rinderpest spread easily and rapidly between
herds of nonimmune cattle, and in some cases escalated to the level
of a panzootic.5 Prior to the final decade of the nineteenth century,
the African continent was virgin soil to rinderpest, but by the end
of that decade, the continent was completely devastated.
Precisely when and where rinderpest was introduced to
Africa is still a mystery. Clive Spinage, John A. Rowe, and Kjell
Hødnebø argue that the 1890’s outbreak of rinderpest was not the
first outbreak, with several minor, isolated outbreaks occurring in
4

Clive Spinage has so far completed the most comprehensive history of
rinderpest in his book, Cattle Plague, where he traces all major outbreaks of the
virus and its impact on peoples across the world. Clive Spinage, Cattle Plague
(New York, NY: Kluwer Academics/Plenum Publishers, 2003).
5
Rodger W. Blowey and A. David Weaver, Color Atlas of Diseases and
Disorders of Cattle, 2nd ed. (Maryland Heights, MO: Mosby, 2003), 189-190.
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Egypt in the early part of the century. They maintain however that
the 1890’s outbreak was by far the worst.6 Several scholars who
have written about 1890’s outbreak of rinderpest, in addition to
Spinage, Rowe, and Hødnebø, assert that it was mostly likely
introduced to the continent somewhere between 1887 and 1889
when Italy sent an army to conquer Ethiopia. Traveling with the
Italians, in what would prove to be a failed campaign, were cattle
from foreign lands used to pull artillery, and it is argued that
among these imported cattle, rinderpest had entered the continent.7
The virus spread quickly from Northeast Africa, where it
killed off great numbers of cattle in Sudan and Ethiopia and moved
down the eastern part of the continent, crashing into the cattle
herds of pastoral peoples in what is present-day Kenya and
Tanzania. One of the ethnic groups that suffered the worst from
rinderpest was the Maasai. The Maasai were pastoralists who, in
addition to cattle-rearing, had a strong warrior tradition. Helge
Kjekshus, in his book focusing on the German colony of
Tanganyika (Tanzania), argued that rinderpest was disastrous to
peoples like the Maasai. Along with breaking the “economic
backbone” of many pastoralist communities, Kjekshus also argued
that rinderpest “initiated a breakdown of a long-established
ecological balance and placed nature again at an advantage.”8
Kjekshus mentioned that rinderpest contributed to mass famine
Spinage, Cattle Plague, 497; John A. Rowe and Kjell Hødnebø, “Rinderpest in
the Sudan 1888-1890: The Mystery of the Missing Panzootic,” Sudanic Africa 5
(1994): 150.
7
Spinage, Cattle Plague, 498; Rowe and Hødnebø, “Rinderpest in the Sudan
1888-1890,” 153-154; Kjeksjus, Ecology Control and Economic Development in
East African History, 127; Jose Burman, Disaster Struck South Africa (Cape
Town, South Africa: C. Struik Ltd., 1971), 63; Nancy J. Jacobs, African History
through Sources: Colonial Contexts and Everyday Experiences, c. 1850-1946 (
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 77.
8
Kjeksjus, Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African
History, 126.
6
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among the Maasai, and also forced them to rely on ethnic polities
that practiced agriculture, like the Wayambo, for food. In terms of
numbers of cattle lost, Kjekshus concluded that the region prior to
the outbreak held approximately 4.5 million cattle, and after
rinderpest had moved through the area, the cattle population
dropped to approximately 450,000—a catastrophic loss to the
locals.9
Prior to 1896, the death and destruction that rinderpest had
wrought in the northern and eastern part of Africa had its
southward spread halted by the natural barrier of the Zambezi
River, and it appeared that the natural barrier would withhold the
virus. However, by February 1896, locals who lived along the river
began to notice cattle dying from some mysterious illness.10 An
article published in the Rhodesia Herald on February 26th
mentioned that this “cattle sickness” had, alongside a locust
outbreak, become a major issue in Rhodesia.11 Being generally
brushed off as a mere cattle disease, people were overly optimistic
that it would run its course. However, by March, it was clear that
the mysterious disease was far more serious than previously made
out. On the 9th of March, J. A. Stevens, the Acting Secretary for
the British South Africa Company, wrote to the Imperial Secretary
based in London about the rising outbreak. Stevens noted that the
disease “is what is believed to be what is called Zambezi cattle
fever,” indicating that at this point people living in northern
Rhodesia still struggled to accurately identify the disease. In his
report of the virus, Stevens also mentioned a long list of symptoms
seen in the cattle, such as “running at eyes and nose,” “intestines

9

Kjeksjus, Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African
History, 131.
10
Spinage, Cattle Plague, 525.
11
“Occasional Notes,” Rhodesia Herald (Harare, Zimbabwe), February 26th,
1896.
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full of blood,” “mucus bloody,” and “slight congestion of the
lungs.” At the end of his report, Stevens, grimly noted that “when
symptoms once appear death follows rapidly,” and even grimmer,
that there were “no cases of recovery yet recorded.”12
The governing body of the British South Africa Company
realized it needed to act, and throughout the first weeks of March,
sent repeated messages to the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules
Robinson, in Cape Town of the British Cape Colony. Robinson
responded by putting the British South Africa Company in
communication with the chief Colonial Veterinary Surgeon of the
Cape Colony, Dr. Duncan Hutcheon. Hutcheon, advising Robinson
and the company government in Rhodesia, and out of fear that the
disease would quickly spread from Rhodesia into the Cape Colony,
recommended Robinson to take rapid action.13 On the same day
that J. A. Stevens wrote his report about “Zambezi cattle fever”
and its symptoms, Hercules Robinson approved an act that would
have dire consequences in the immediate future.
Indeed, on March 9th, Sir Robinson permitted an order that
fit into the legislative framework of the Animal Diseases Act of
1881, which was a law, once enacted, that allowed for a ban on
movement of cattle, a quarantine of infected regions, and the
destruction of infected herds.14 Most importantly, in the order,
12

J. A. Stevens to Imperial Secretary, March 9th, 1896, in Correspondence
Relating to the Outbreak of Rinderpest in South Africa in March 1896 (London,
UK: Eyere and Spottiswoode, 1896), 2.
13
Spinage, Cattle Plague, 526.
14
Daniel Gilfoyle, “Veterinary Research and the African Rinderpest Epizootic:
The Cape Colony, 1896-1898,” 136; The Animal Diseases Act of 1881 was
created as a means to protect cattle and other domestic animals in the British
Empire from the spread of disease. The act gave imperial officials in British
colonies the right to control the movement, particularly the importation and
exportation of livestock, require locals to report signs of disease to law
enforcement, and authorize the killings of sick and healthy animals when and
where deemed necessary. Hercules Tennant and Edgar Michael Jackson, eds.,
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there was opportunity for healthy cattle to get killed as well; “any
cattle found trespassing . . . may be destroyed by the owner or
occupier of the land trespassed upon.”15 Healthy cattle could be
also legally killed by local authorities when they deemed “it
desirable to isolate or destroy in order to prevent the spread of
infection.”16
On March 11, the Rhodesia Herald noted that the colonial
government had taken notice. In the article, there was also an
agreement to keep all main roads open, however, “all native cattle”
had to be “removed five miles from it.”17 Sir Robinson wrote a
message to Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the
Colonies, that the disease afflicting Rhodesia and threatening other
British colonies was “rinderpest, or a disease almost identical with
Rinderpest.” Robinson had mentioned to Chamberlain that the
order he signed on the 9th, which entailed “the removal and, where
necessary, the destruction, of cattle,” would “have the effect of
confining the disease.” At the end of his missive, he mentioned
that he was greatly concerned about the welfare of both native
Africans and European settlers, stating “the whole of the wealth of
the native population is invested in cattle,” and “a large proportion
of the European farmers are also dependent on the pastoral
industry.”18 Little did Robinson and his veterinary consultant

Statutes of the Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1895 (Cape Town, South Africa: W.
A. Richards and Sons, 1895), 3260-3264.
15
Hercules Robinson, March 9th, 1896, in Correspondence Relating to the
Outbreak of Rinderpest in South Africa in March 1896 (London, UK: Eyere and
Spottiswoode, 1896), 2.
16
Ibid.
17
“More Cattle Disease,” Rhodesia Herald (Harare, Zimbabwe), March 11th,
1896.
18
Hercules Robinson to Joseph Chamberlain, March 11 th, 1896,
Correspondence Relating to the Outbreak of Rinderpest in South Africa in
March 1896 (London, UK: Eyere and Spottiswoode, 1896), 1.
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Hutcheon know that the order that they approved would be
received quite negatively by the Matabele people.
In order to better explain how a series of veterinary
containment practices—which scholar Daniel Gilfoyle considers to
be, from the veterinary perspective of the time, uncontroversial—
became an important factor for the Matabele to rise against the
British, it is important to understand both the importance that cattle
had in their society as well as the political climate in the region.19
The political climate prior to the rinderpest outbreak had already
been tense. The first mass wave of European settlers moved in land
owned by the Matabele in 1890, when the British South Africa
Company established a series of settlements in the area. A member
of the Matabele, Ndansi Kumalo, recalled that “we were terribly
upset and very angry at the coming of the white men.”20 Three year
later, in 1893, a fierce war was fought between the Matabele and
Shona people against the government of the British South Africa
Company over issues of stolen cattle. The war did not last long,
with the soldiers serving the British South Africa Company using
technology like heavy machine guns to force the Matabele forces
to seek peace terms by the beginning of the following year. By the
outbreak of rinderpest in Rhodesia in 1896, a great amount of
tension still existed between the Matabele and the British South
Africa Company because of the war, as well as the increasing
influx of white settlers who continued to build settlements on what
used to be Matabele land.21 Kumalo mentioned how after the
Daniel Gilfoyle, “Veterinary Research and the African Rinderpest Epizootic:
The Cape Colony, 1896-1898,” 136.
20
Ndansi Kumalo, “The Story of Ndansi Kumalo of the Matabele Tribe,
Southern Rhodesia,” in Ten Africans, ed. Margery Perham (London, UK: Faber
and Faber Ltd., 1936), 69.
21
Enocent Msindo, Ethnicity in Zimbabwe: Transformations in Kalanga and
Ndebele Societies, 1860-1990 (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press,
2012), 94.
19
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fighting, “the white men sent police who did abdominal things,”
such as physical assaults and the thievery of cattle, and that the
Matabele were “treated like slaves.”22
The Matabele were largely a pastoral people who also
maintained a strong warrior tradition. When he was growing up,
Ndansi Kumalo talked of how he learned to both take careful care
of cattle and become a warrior. He mentioned that it was his
responsibility as a child to round his family’s cattle up, and if he
forgot even just one, he would “get a good thrashing.”23 In
Matabele society, cattle represented much more than just a basic
source of food. Cattle were seen as a form of currency and bride
wealth. Cattle were also significant for pastoral peoples in southern
Africa because they were commonly used in sacred rituals and in
occasional sacrifices.24 Kumalo recalled when rinderpest first
appeared in the herds of the Matabele, stating the cattle began to
die off quickly. He also stated that the Matabele “could not help
thinking that all these dreadful things” like the outbreak of
rinderpest “were brought by the white people.”25 The fact that
rinderpest was so deadly by itself, killing off the entirety of the
herds it infected, made the government policies of killing both
infected and none-infected cattle all the more devastating to
pastoral African people like the Matabele.26 Although the
Ndansi Kumalo, “The Story of Ndansi Kumalo of the Matabele Tribe,
Southern Rhodesia,” 72.
23
Ndansi Kumalo, “The Story of Ndansi Kumalo of the Matabele Tribe,
Southern Rhodesia,” 66.
24
Sean Redding, Sorcery and Sovereignty: Taxation, Power, and Rebellion in
South Africa, 1880-1963 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2006), 66.
25
Ndansi Kumalo, “The Story of Ndansi Kumalo of the Matabele Tribe,
Southern Rhodesia,” 72.
26
There is also strong evidence that the white population living in British
colonies in southern Africa also reacted negatively to the legal killing of cattle.
Daniel Gilfoyle mentions twice in his work, “Veterinary Research and the
African Rinderpest Epizootic,” that whites showed strong resistance to the
killings. On September 12, white farmers exclaimed directly before Hutcheon
22
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following brief song originates with the Sotho—another southern
African cattle-rearing people—and not the Matabele, it is still an
excellent direct statement of how crippling the loss of cattle from
rinderpest—and the treatments forced upon African pastoralists by
the government—was:
No more cattle, no more milk: what will we eat?
No more cattle, no more fuel: what will we burn?
No more cattle, no more skins…what will we wear?
No more cattle, no more weddings: how will we marry?
No more cattle, no more plowing, except the slow plowing with picks,
slow, tiring and insufficient for the vast spaces that the Basotho
have set aside for cultivation. Where will we eat? And where will we
earn money?27

On the final days of March 1896, members of the Matabele
chose to make a stand and fight against the British South Africa
Company and its European settlers in Rhodesia. The rebellion
caught the company government completely by surprise and cause
an explosive stirring in the local media. An April 1st article from
the Rhodesia Herald wrote of the confusion and commotion the
colony was suddenly experiencing. Stating that “a rising of some
description has undoubtedly taken place among the Matabele,” the
article also described killings of white settlers and mass
movements of settlers into large towns like Bulawayo.28 Another

that they would rather be shot before they would allow their cattle to be killed.
Later in October, a group of white cattle farmers confronted, and eventually
routed, a contingent of police who were in process of rounding up cattle to be
killed. Gilfoyle, “Veterinary Research and the African Rinderpest Epizootic:
The Cape Colony, 1896-1898,” 135, 138.
27
H. Dieterlen, “La peste bovine au sud de l’Afrique,” Journal des Missions
Evangeliques, (1897): 16-17, in African History through Sources: Colonial
Contexts and Everyday Experiences, c. 1850-1946, Nancy Jacobs, 79.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
28
“Native Rising,” Rhodesia Herald (Harare, Zimbabwe), April 1st, 1896.
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article in the same issue of the same newspaper talked of the
rebellion, using derogatory words to describe the Matabele like
“kaffir,” along with talks of both whites and natives being killed.29
By looking at the local media in the immediate few days
following the rise of the Matabele, alongside reports of progress
and setbacks on the frontlines, a clearer picture emerges on what
the cause of the rebellion was. The Rhodesia Herald argued that, at
the moment, “the causes are complex and uncertain.”30 Just a few
days later, in an article published by the Rhodesian newspaper, the
Bulawayo Chronicle, Cecil Rhodes was interviewed, and he
thought the causes of the rebellion was “due to the premature
arming of the Matabele as policemen.” However, the author of the
Chronicle article had also received the opinion of the “Native
Commissioners,” and that they were adamant that this was unlikely
the reason.31
On March 28th, in the very immediate wake of the
rebellion, an author for the Bulawayo Chronicle pondered the
possibility of a link between the legally enforced shooting of cattle
and the agitation of the locals. The author specifically stated that
“the course of the disease [rinderpest] among the cattle, and the
conquest shooting of them,” by colonial authorities under the
guidance of the colonial veterinarians, “may have aroused bitter
feelings.” At the same time, however, it appears that the author
attempted to justify the shooting of cattle, and therefore failed to
understand truly why shooting of cattle by government agents
would trigger bitter feelings, because he wrote that “the Chief

“Brushes with the Natives,” Rhodesia Herald (Harare, Zimbabwe), April 1st,
1896.
30
“Native Rising,” Rhodesia Herald (Harare, Zimbabwe), April 1st, 1896.
31
“Mr. Rhodes at Salisbury,” Bulawayo Chronicle, April 4th, 1896.
29
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Native Commissioner had explained this very well to them [the
Matabele], when the measures were adopted.”32
The papers occasionally printed articles with a Eurocentric
analysis of the Matabele culture when trying to come up with an
explanation for the rebellion. An article printed by the Bulawayo
Chronicle April 22nd, 1896, prioritized Matabele religion as the
cause for the rebellion, however, at the same time took great pains
to explain the importance that cattle held for the Matabele. The
article wrote that “faith in the M’Limo or native god has ranked
among the foremost” causes for the rise. However, the article also
talks of the fact that “the native has an intense love for his cattle . .
. being the zenith of a kafir’s happiness,” and even states that “he
[the Ndebele] treasures his oxen like a miner his gold.”33 Even
with the premium placed on religion as a major cause for the
rebellion, the article failed to mention the mass killing of Matabele
cattle by colonial officials. The fact that the relationship that the
Matabele had with cattle was so strong—in the case of this article,
from an outsider’s understanding Matabele culture—and that it is
well known that cattle were forcefully killed, taking the additional
step of connecting the two is important. Other local Rhodesian
newspapers managed to make this connection, the importance of
cattle to the Matabele and the forced killing of them, as a major
reason for the Matabele to rise against the British.
On April 22nd, an author for Rhodesia Herald wrote that “it
has been said that if the Matabeleland and cattle questions had
been managed differently,” there would have been no rebellion.
The author of the article reasoned if it was really due to how the
British South Africa Company trying to stop the rinderpest spread
by killing and seizing cattle that drove the Matabele to rebellion, “a
limited amount of sympathy could be entertained for the natives.”
32
33

“Bulawayo’s Safety,” Bulawayo Chronicle, March 28th, 1896.
“A Broken Idol,” Bulawayo Chronicle, April 22nd, 1896.
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However, the article, in an extremely biased and inaccurate way,
emphasized that the sympathy “must be very limited” because of
“the hideous method the Matabele chose to revenge themselves.”34
An article printed by the Bulawayo Chronicle on the 22nd of
June 1896, presented the causes for the rise of the Matabele with
less racist view than the Rhodesian Herald article of the 22nd of
April. The article in the Chronicle wrote that religious influences
combined with “the recent destruction of cattle owing to the
ravages of rinderpest, were responsible for the present rising.”35
This article carefully identified that there was no single great cause
for the rise of the Matabele, arguing rather that it was a
combination of reasons, in this case religion and the killing of
Matabele cattle by colonial authorities, that caused the rise.
However, it is still clear that the killing of the cattle was one of the
more predominant causes and is extrapolated as such in
international media covering the outbreak of rinderpest and the rise
of the Matabele.
Consider this: On March 28th, 1896, in the immediate
outbreak of the Matabele Rebellion, the San Francisco Chronicle
published an article that speculated the causes of the rebellion. The
article wrote that “possibly one cause of the disturbance is the
regulations recently enforced to stamp out rinderpest.”36 Like the
Bulawayo Chronicle article printed on the 22nd of April, it was
mentioned that the “Kaffire” were “greatly attached to their cattle.”
The exact same report and claim that the killing of the cattle was a
major cause for the rebellion was printed in another California
newspaper, the Los Angeles Times, on the very same day.37

“Late News,” Rhodesia Herald (Harare, Zimbabwe), April 22nd, 1896.
“The Native Rising,” Bulawayo Chronicle, June 20th, 1896.
36
“Revolt in South Africa,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 28th, 1896.
37
“Matabele Revolt,” Los Angeles Times, March 28th, 1896
34
35
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Even in the British metropole, newspapers managed to
connect the killing of cattle by colonial authorities as important
cause of the Matabele Rebellion. In April, an article printed in the
Manchester Guardian wrote that “the killing of cattle on the
account of renderpest [sic] disturbs the native mind.”38 Another
article printed in the Manchester Guardian a month later asked the
figurative question, “how, then, has the present “rebellion” come
about?” Before stating its own answer, the article went into depth
describing the rinderpest outbreak in Rhodesia and mentioned that
the mass killing of cattle as a containment practice was something
“the natives could not be expected to understand.” The article
continued to belittle the Matabele by stating that while the
Matabele were acting “unreasonably from an intelligent white
man’s point of view,” it was understandable that the “natives
regarded this [the killings] as a fresh and intolerable outrage.” The
article concluded with a certain degree of sympathy for the
Matabele, albeit using extremely racist language, stating how the
Matabele were “goaded to desperation by wholesale cattle seizing
and cattle killing,” which “encouraged the “rebellion.””39
In the end, the Matabele Rebellion only lasted for
approximately a year, and even when members of the Shona polity
joined their side partway through the conflict, the Matabele were
defeated by a massive force of British soldiers.40 Rinderpest
certainly played a role in their defeat because more and more
Matabele cattle continued to die of the virus during the campaign
“Special Morning Express: The Matabele Rising,” Manchester Guardian,
April 13th, 1896.
39
“Matabeleland and the Charter Company,” Manchester Guardian, May 27th,
1896.
40
For more information on the Second Matabele War, see T. O. Ranger, Revolt
in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-97: A Study in African Resistance (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1967) and Robin H. Palmer, “War and Land in
Rhodesia,” Transafrican Journal of History 1, no. 2 (July 1971).
38
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which contributed to considerable starvation amongst the
population.41 Despite the defeat of the Matabele by the British
colonial state, the Matabele Rebellion—along with a another local
rebellion that took place in December 1896—managed to achieve
at least one positive and unrealized consequence, which was that
the fear of additional rebellions by natives in southern Africa led to
the British colonial authorities to minimize and eventually stop the
legalized mass killing of cattle as a preventative measure to contain
rinderpest.42 The fear of future rebellions caused by the killing of
cattle can be seen in an article printed in the Manchester Guardian
on November 23rd, 1896. The article warned that if cattle
belonging to “warlike tribes Swazis, Basutos, and Zulus are to be
shot,” a massive and immediate rebellion amongst these African
polities would have been likely.43 By the end of 1896, under the
leadership of the Chief Veterinarian of the Cape Colony, Duncan
Hutcheon, the killing of native cattle was minimized, and a new
line of defense had to be drawn at the Orange River, with hopes
that rigorous quarantining and the establishment of a fence line
along the river, would be the best hope of preventing the disease
from spreading any further.44
Despite all of the money that the British colonial state had
invested in its colonies in southern Africa to stop the spread of
rinderpest, Hutcheon’s last-ditch defense made at the Orange River
41

Burman, Disaster Struck South Africa, 65.
In November 1896, the killing of cattle by colonial police sparked another
rebellion—this time among Africans belonging to the Tswana ethnic group—in
the British colony of Bechuanaland. The rebellion was short-lived, ending in
August of the next year, but it, along with the Matabele Rebellion, caused the
British colonial governments in southern Africa to reconsider the legal mass
killings as a preventative measure for rinderpest. Harry Saker and J. Aldridge,
“The Origins of the Langeberg Rebellion,” The Journal of African History 12,
no. 2 (1971): 299.
43
“Interview with Mr. Selous,” Manchester Guardian, November 23, 1896.
44
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even proved a failure. On March 24th, 1897, rinderpest was
discovered for the first time in the Cape Colony. The failure of
Hutcheon’s method proved that the previous European idea of
disease containment would not work in the African environment,
and something else had to be attempted.45 The second round of
attempts to stop rinderpest, while maintaining element of
quarantining, the mass shootings of sick and healthy cattle were
minimized. This time inoculation, under the leadership of the
German bacteriologist, Robert Koch, was attempted. However, it
was in fact local scientists who came up with a preventative
treatment that witnessed some success. Blood-serum injections,
where the blood and serum (plasma) of an infected cow was
strategically injected into a healthy cow, provided immunity for
many herds. However, not all cattle herds—more specifically the
owners of these herds—were treated equally. White farmers were
granted more access to the blood serum more so than their African
pastoralist and farmer counterparts. By 1899, rinderpest presence
had significantly declined and in 1905 it was eliminated from
South Africa.46
Regardless of how the rinderpest panzootic ended in
southern Africa at the conclusion of the nineteenth century, the
outbreak and the first methods employed to contain it had
disastrous consequences for African natives who suffered the worst
from both. In Rhodesia, it was the cattle herds of the Matabele that
had to take the brunt of the virus, and who were forced to endure
veterinary practices that required the shooting of even their healthy
cattle. The practice of cattle shooting coupled with dissent that had
already existed for the British South Africa Company since 1894,
Gilfoyle, “Veterinary Research and the African Rinderpest Epizootic,” 139.
Amanda Kay McVety, The Rinderpest Campaigns: A Virus, Its Vaccines, and
Global Development in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2018), 27-30; Spinage, Cattle Plague, 567.
45
46
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was motivation for the Matabele to take agency into their own
hands and fight back. Although the rebellion ended in failure, and
their cattle continued to die of rinderpest in droves, the Matabele’s
fight against the British made the colonial government reconsider
its practices of shooting cattle. The long and atrocious fight against
rinderpest in nineteenth-century Africa is proof that diseases, even
those that do not infect people, have an impact on human history.
As W. McNeil put it, humans have and will continue to be at
mercy of the historical agency of disease, since “we remain caught
in a web of life—permanently and irretrievably—no matter how
clever we are at altering what we do not like.”47
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